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An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United
After recurring bouts of financial panics and banking crises, and a particularly severe one in 1907, a clamor arose among policy circles and the business community that the United States was in need of serious banking and currency reform. Part of this reform would be the creation of an institution that would, when the system was threatened with periodic regional or national financial crises, provide the necessary liquidity to support the banks that were in duress-the so- In the next section, we sketch how the mandates of the Fed have morphed over time from a predominantly financial stability goal at its outset in 1913 to facilitating fiscal financing during WWII and its aftermath, to a higher emphasis on inflation stabilization and price stability from the late 1970s until the 2007 subprime crisis. Now, possibly, the pendulum is swinging back to place a greater weight on its initial mandate of financial stability, which policymakers and financial markets had come to take for granted during the post-war era.
In Section III we present evidence to suggest that across all these regimes, whether the mandate was financial stability, low inflation and full employment, or public debt monetization, This failure led to the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and its supervision mandate. During the course of the 1930s a relatively laissez faire approach to financial markets (both domestically and internationally) gave way to a significant increase in the regulation of the financial industry and erected barriers to the international flow of financial capital that was the hallmark of the now-defunct gold standard. This wave of financial deglobalization, while somewhat more extreme, is not unlike the trends that have been set in motion by the recent crisis, especially in Europe. During this first era, the Fed did have multiple instruments at its disposal apart from setting interest rates. Unfortunately, some of these instruments of policy were employed procyclically. For example, reserve requirements were doubled (from 13 to 26%) between 1935 and 1937 in the midst of the Depression (see Table 1 ).
While substantial public debts were accumulated during the 1930s (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) , there nothing in US history to match the debt build up that would accompany elsewhere. Such a long uninterrupted period of tranquility was a new phenomenon in the history of finance. Ultimately, the sustained monetary policy accommodation combined with adverse supply shocks gave way to persistent inflation (see Figure 1) and ushered in the more recent era of an independent Fed with the restoration of price stability as its main mandate. is necessary to briefly review key features of its prior incarnations. The fact that the colossal failure of the 1930s gave rise to other institutions that took on supervisory responsibilities helped pave the way, in principle, for the Fed to focus more of its energy on the goal of inflation and countercyclical macroeconomic stabilization in the modern era. It is notable that post WWII, the highly regulated financial markets with their intense home bias gave rise to only few crises in advanced economies (especially in comparison to the panic-ridden pre-war era). This quietus facilitated the view in both academic and policy circles that advanced economies had outgrown severe financial crises, and these were a phenomenon confined to the emerging markets. In an environment where other supervisory institutions and financial markets were thought to be monitoring risk the Fed mandate eventually narrowed to emphasize inflation and unemployment.
As the mandate became more focused, older instruments of monetary policy were discarded as 1 It has to be noted that what was achieved in the era of the "great moderation" was inflation stability-not price stability, as Figure 1 In the next section, we suggest that irrespective of the changes in the Fed's mandates, credit aggregates merit a larger role in setting policy and gauging financial conditionsespecially if financial stability regains a more prominent role in policy design.
III. Interest Rates and Credit
In the past three decades, the behavior and evolution of private credit has received comparatively little attention as an indicator of aggregate demand, inflationary pressures or as a potential early warning of financial vulnerability. On the latter score, the key role of credit booms in anticipating financial crises in advanced economies since the late 19 th century is extensively documented Schularick and Taylor (2012) . The evidence for emerging markets presented in Mendoza and Terrones (2012) is equally compelling; as they observe, not every credit boom ends in crisis but nearly all crises are preceded by credit booms.
Here we present evidence that across time and regimes ranging from the relatively globalized and laissez faire financial system of the "roaring 1920s" and pre-2007 crisis to the post-WWII financial repression era, the behavior of credit has provided valuable and complementary information about the "de facto" stance of monetary policy (or, more accurately, monetary or liquidity conditions) to that incorporated in the short-term policy interest rate. To clarify, we follow the widely accepted convention that the intent to tighten/ease monetary policy is signaled primarily through an increase/decrease in policy interest rate(s) and that this intent defines "de jure" policy. Along those lines, Romer and Romer (1989) are more concerned with defining policy intent. Here we suggest that credit conditions may re-enforce the changes in the policy interest rate at a given point in time or they may counteract those changes. Thus "de facto" monetary or liquidity conditions may on occasion substantially differ from what might be perceived based on interest rates alone.
An illustration for consumer credit: 1919-2012
Given the depth of its equity, corporate bond and commercial paper markets, the United
States is considered to be the least bank-dependent economy in the world, at least when it comes to corporate finance. For households, however, banks play a dominant role in the US as they do in other countries. Hence, our focus on consumer credit here. Since, as shown in Figure 2 , only 9 of the 93 annual observations show a contraction in consumer credit (and these 9 observations are clustered in three episodes), it will be more informative to describe credit conditions in terms of whether credit growth is accelerating or decelerating in a particular year. In addition, to describe whether monetary policy is tighter or more accommodative, we focus on the basis point change in interest rates in a given year. Since 1955 we use on the federal funds rate while the discount rate fills that role over 1913-1954. Our aim is to assess year by year whether the signals coming from credit tend to reenforce or offset the signals coming from interest rates. A year when the policy rate is declining and credit growth is accelerating is counted as an observation of unambiguous easing as both indicators of monetary conditions re-enforce. With interest rates being the primary instrument, a year in which rates are falling but credit growth is unchanged or decelerating is counted as mixed easing. A neutral to easier observation comes from a year where the policy interest rate is unchanged but credit growth is accelerating. Symmetric definitions apply for tightening.
The results of this accounting exercise for 1921-2012 (92 years) are presented in Table 2 . 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Prior to examining the results, it is important to highlight some of the limitations of the exercise. First, whether credit is accelerating or decelerating the data point reflects a final outcome; further analysis would be required to sort out whether the observed outcome primarily owes to supply or demand shifts. Second, we look at credit momentum and interest rate changes to characterize a particular year; their dynamic relationship is not explored. It is to be expected that sometimes rising interest rates will only show up in a deceleration in credit only in the following year; Similarly, a credit boom in an overheated economy may lead to a deliberate policy tightening and rising policy interest rates that does not immediately gain traction in credit markets. Third, while interest rates are taken to be the primary instrument (really the only instrument in the post 1980s financial liberalization period), this was not always the case.
Reserve requirement changes were also a part of the policy tool kit in an earlier era. Even more explicitly impacting credit was the past use of credit controls, as highlighted in More than 23 percent of the time, rising policy interest rates are not accompanied by slowing credit (i.e., mixed tightening category). Several observations from the high inflation years of the 1970s fall in this bucket. Perhaps it owes to interest rate increases that were insufficient, only following or accommodating the rapid rise of inflation at that time. By contrast, Table 3 , which lists the years where credit and the policy rate gave re-enforcing signals, flags the famous Volcker anti-inflation tightening that began in October 1979. The double signal also captures the now notorious procyclical tightening in 1931 that involved a 150 basis point increase in the discount rate alongside a 17 percent deceleration in credit growth also makes the list. Notably, all the dates of unambiguous tightening map well onto the NBER's dating of recessions, as these followed the policy change within one or two years. Years of unambiguous easing include 1933 and 1934 after the abandonment of the gold standard, 1983 (the Fed actually began lowering rates in August 1982) and the early 1990s. Recent years do not figure in this list. years: 1922 years: , 1933 years: . 1934 years: , 1971 years: , 1976 years: , 1983 years: , 1992 years: , 1993 years: Unambiguous tightening years: 1926 years: , 1931 years: , 1953 years: , 1956 years: , 1957 years: , 1966 years: , 1969 years: , 1974 years: , 1979 years: , 1980 years: , 1995 years: and 2005 Source: Authors' calculations.
IV. Policy Implications: Back to the Future
In the post crisis environment, the Federal Reserve is likely to attach a greater weight to a financial stability objective than it had prior to the crisis-at least for some time. Since the price stability and full employment goals have not been set aside, we call attention to the fact that multiple policy goals usually call for multiple instruments. Yet over the past three decades both the academic literature and the policy practice have increasingly drifted to a world view where the short term policy rate is a sufficient policy instrument. The theoretical underpinnings supporting that view usually assume complete markets, an assumption that is particularly at odds with a post crisis environment riddled with a broad assortment of frictions arising from both market failures and a steady stream of complex regulatory changes set in motion by the crisis. In that environment, policies, such as changes in reserve and margin requirements and a variety of credit measures that have been discarded as antiquated should again be a part of the toolkit of central banks in the US and other advanced economies, at least until a far more robust and effective regulatory superstructure is firmly in place. As just one example, if the Federal
